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Abstract—SRAM-based FPGAs are in-field reconfigurable an 
unlimited number of times. This characteristic, together with 
their high performance and high logic density, proves to be very 
convenient for a number of ground and space level applications. 
One drawback of this technology is that it is susceptible to ionizing 
radiation, and this sensitivity increases with technology scaling. 
This is a first order concern for applications in harsh radiation 
environments, and starts to be a concern for high reliability 
ground applications. Several techniques exist for coping with 
radiation effects at user application. In order to be effective they 
need to be complemented with configuration memory scrubbing, 
which allows error mitigation and prevents failures due to error 
accumulation. Depending on the radiation environment and on 
the system dependability requirements, the configuration scrubber 
design can become more or less complex. This paper classifies 
and presents current and novel design methodologies and archi-
tectures for SRAM-based FPGAs, and in particular for Xilinx 
Virtex-4QV/5QV, configuration memory scrubbers. 
Index Terms—Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), recon-
figuration, scrubbing, single event upset, Xilinx. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
W HEN compared to other FPGA technologies, SRAM-based FPGAs allow high performance, high logic den-
sity and low Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs. At the 
same time, the FPGA can be statically reconfigured, after the 
initial power-on configuration, practically an unlimited number 
of times. Moreover, some FPGAs can be partially reconfigured 
during run-time without interrupting the application. Dynamic 
partial reconfigurability can be exploited in different ways, as 
will be seen in this paper. These are valuable features for a 
number of applications, for example those requiring reconfig-
urable processing or remote configuration upgrades. In partic-
ular, interest of re-programmable FPGAs for space applications 
has been shown since more than one decade ago [l]-[4]. Be-
cause configuration memory is volatile, an external device needs 
to take care of power-on and subsequent reconfigurations. In 
some cases this device can be simply an external non-volatile 
memory that provides configuration data for FPGA to self-re-
configure. In others, a higher level of intelligence is required. 
On the other hand, when designing for applications where 
ionizing radiation is relevant (e.g., space, medical or nuclear 
power plants) the device radiation tolerance is a first order con-
cern. SRAM-based FPGAs are known to be sensitive to radia-
tion, so in order to benefit from the aforementioned features also 
in harsh radiation environments, their radiation tolerance needs 
to be improved by design. The FPGA architecture and the radi-
ation effects on it need to be well understood for implementing 
effective error mitigation techniques. In particular, mitigation 
techniques for the FPGA configuration layer are addressed in 
this paper. 
Scrubbing is an effective error mitigation technique for 
configuration memory in SRAM-based FPGAs. It consists 
on a post-configuration write of the configuration memory 
to restore its initial state. This can be done in SRAM-based 
FPGAs without interrupting the system operation, and aims at 
mitigating errors before their accumulation induces a system 
failure. Circuitry performing such task is informally known as 
scrubber. Depending on the system-level constraints and on the 
radiation environment for the application, different scrubber 
implementation options exist involving more or less overhead 
in terms of complexity, area and power consumption. 
In spite of the complexity added to implement error miti-
gation, the benefits of SRAM-based FPGAs are considered to 
be dominant in many applications. Alternatives to this tech-
nology for harsh radiation environments are basically anti-fuse 
(ROM-based) and Flash-based [4]. Anti-fuse technology is 
inherently radiation-tolerant but, while suitable for many appli-
cations, it does not support in-field reconfiguration. Regarding 
flash technology, its TID limitations and potential charge 
leakage is undergoing scrutiny by the industry. Besides, for the 
moment it does not support dynamic partial reconfiguration. 
Finally, among SRAM alternatives, Xilinx Virtex-4QV/5QV 
are found to have the highest logic density, performance and 
radiation-tolerance altogether. Therefore, the present work will 
focus on the latter FPGAs. An in-depth comparison of FPGA 
technologies for harsh radiation environments is out of the 
scope of this paper and can be found in the literature [5], [6]. 
The main contribution of the present work has been to 
identify, classify and compare the main trends in configura-
tion scrubbing techniques, methodologies and architectures 
for SRAM-based FPGAs (and in particular for Xilinx Virtex 
series), to provide the designer with criteria for trading-off 
the different options, and to provide system-level considera-
tions when reliability and/or power consumption are design 
drivers. The paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls 
the Xilinx Virtex FPGA architecture. Section III summarizes 
the Radiation Effects on the Xilinx Virtex FPGA. Section IV 
presents the Configuration Memory Scrubbing Overview. 
Section V presents the Configuration Memory Scrubbing 
Basics. Section VI presents usual and novel Scrubbing Method-
ologies. Section VII presents the elementary Scrubber Design 
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Fig. 1. Xilinx Virtex conceptual layers: Application Layer (user logic and 
memory) and Configuration Layer (logic and routing resources configuration). 
Architectures. Section VIII discusses main System-Level Con-
siderations, in particular Reliability, Availability and Power 
Consumption. Finally, Section IX draws some Conclusions. 
II. XILINX VIRTEX FPGA ARCHITECTURE 
Xilinx Virtex FPGAs can be conceptually split in two layers, 
namely Application Layer (from now on, A-Layer) and Con-
figuration Layer (from now on, C-Layer). A-Layer includes the 
logic and memory elements managed by user's application and 
C-Layer includes the logic and memory elements that allow 
configuring the logic and routing resources in the A-Layer. 
These layers are represented in Fig. 1. 
A. Application Layer 
The A-Layer comprises the logic, memory and input/output 
resources for user application. Most of the layer implements 
Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs), which can be configured to 
implement any user sequential or combinational circuit. Each 
CLB in turn consists of several slices, and each slice contains 
Look-Up Tables (LUTs), registers and carry logic. LUTs can be 
eventually used as distributed RAM resources (LUTRAMs) or 
shift registers (SRL16/32). Some static control signals have pre-
assigned logic levels via weak keeper pull-ups and pull-downs 
known as half-latches, wich can be forced to a hard logic level 
via internal routing. 
The other fundamental components are the Input/Output 
Blocks (IOBs). Each IOB can be configured for a wide va-
riety of interface standards and voltage levels. This layer also 
implements a number of application resources depending on 
the specific FPGA, being the most relevant the following: 
dedicated dual-port SelectRAM blocks (BRAMs), dedicated 
multipliers (physically located next to BRAMs) and DSP 
blocks, Digital Clock Managers (DCMs), embedded PowerPC 
processors (PPC), Multi-Gigabit serial Transceivers (MGT) and 
10/100/1000 Ethernet MAC (EMAC). Finally, a large General 
Routing Matrix (GRM) connects all the elementary blocks. 
Two main Xilinx Virtex-4 and -5 radiation-tolerant families 
have been released so far, namely Virtex-4QV and -5QV (or 
shortly, XQR4V and XQR5V). They are manufactured on a 
90-nm and 65-nm CMOS process, respectively, on thin epitaxial 
silicon wafers. Besides the manufacturing process, the XQR4V 
parts are functionally identical to their commercial counterparts. 
However the XQR5 V design has been optimized for a better ra-
diation tolerance, or as the manufacturer claims, it has been Ra-
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"XQR4V slices have 2 4-input LUTs and 2 registers. XQR5V slices 
have 4 6-input LUTs and 4 registers. 
*XQR4V DSP blocks have 18x18 multipliers. XQR5V DSP blocks have 
25x18 multipliers. 
diation Hardened By Design (RHBD). The resources available 
for user application are summarized in Table I. 
B. Configuration Layer 
The C-Layer comprises the configuration memory and 
associated access ports and control logic. Virtex-4 FPGAs 
implement the following access ports for reading and writing 
from/to configuration memory: JTAG (Joint Test Action 
Group), master/slave serial and master/slave SelectMAP (Se-
lectable Microprocessor Access Port), the latter available in 
8 and 32-bit bus width. In addition to them, Virtex-5 FPGAs 
implement master SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface), master BPI 
(Byte Peripheral Interface) and slave SelectMAP in 8/16/32-bit 
bus width. According to the manufacturer [7], SelectMAP 
provides the most efficient device access for scrubbing, and the 
8-bit bus width is typically used for scrubber implementations 
as it does not require data word alignment. In Virtex-5, a bus 
width auto-detection feature has been added, thus simplifying 
the implementation oí scrubbers for 16/32-bit bus widths. 
The configuration port is internally connected to a built-in 
circuitry that decodes the configuration data packets, providing 
read/write access to the configuration control registers and to the 
configuration memory. In addition to the configuration ports, the 
configuration controller can be reached from within the A-Layer 
via the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP). This allows 
the implementation of scrubbers internal to the FPGA. 
Major architectural changes were implemented in Virtex-4 
C-Layer with respect to its predecessors .frame size was reduced 
and kept uniform across the device, frames were distributed into 
rows allowing a 2D mapping of configuration memory, built-in 
masking of dynamic memory elements was implemented al-
lowing transparent readback, and Error Correction Code (ECC) 
was embedded into the frame structure. Further architectural im-
provements were implemented in Virtex-5, specifically built-in 
blocks supporting Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) computa-
tions. ECC and CRC will be described in Section VA. 
III. RADIATION EFFECTS ON XILINX VIRTEX FPGAS 
SRAM-based FPGAs are sensitive to ionizing radiation 
effects, which induce both a long term cumulative degradation 
(Total Ionization Dose, or TID, and displacement), as well as 
instantaneous damage (Single Event Effects, or SEE). SEE can 
in turn be classified into soft errors, which affect data integrity, 
and hard errors, which damage silicon structures. Soft errors 
are reversible, like Single Event Upset (SEU), Multiple Bit 
Upset (MBU) or Single Event Transient (SET), but hard errors 
can be destructive, like Single Event Latch-up (SEL). In par-
ticular, commercial Xilinx Virtex FPGAs are also sensitive to 
some SEE types. For harsh radiation environment applications, 
the XQR4V/5 V families offer improved protection against SEL 
and higher TID levels. For XQR4V, C-Layer SEUs are still a 
concern as they are a major contributor to system failure rate. 
A-Layer SEUs (but not MBUs) can be mitigated with different 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) strategies. For XQR5V, 
the manufacturer claims that C-Layer SEUs are 1000 x lower 
than in XQR4V [8]. In addition, architectural improvements 
in this device, such as built-in Error Detection and Correc-
tion (EDAC) for BRAM and SET filters for flip-flops, allow 
reducing A-Layer upsets significantly. 
When high-energy particles strike the FPGA, soft errors can 
appear either in A-Layer or in the underlying C-Layer. When 
in A-Layer, soft error effects can be transient or persistent, de-
pending on whether the affected logic has memory (sequential 
logic, flip-flops, BRAMs, half-latches) or is memoryless (com-
binational logic). These soft errors can lead to Single Event 
Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) affecting part of the device or the 
whole of it. When in C-Layer, soft errors can affect configu-
ration logic or routing resources, and their effects are persistent 
until a partial or global reconfiguration restores the initially con-
figured value. In the case oí soft errors affecting the configura-
tion controller or other built-in functions, SEFIs may also occur 
and can only be recovered by FPGA re-initialization. 
The functional effects of soft errors in logic resources have 
been extensively researched [9], [10]. XQR4Vhas been experi-
mentally characterized for both static and dynamic soft errors 
[11], [12]. For XQR5V, some SEU/SEFI figures can also be 
found in [8], [13] and [14]. Soft errors in routing resources, even 
if not used by the A-Layer, may also have functional effect as 
they may create shorts or bridges between logic resources. In-
deed, soft errors in routing resources may induce single or mul-
tiple errors in the A-Layer [15]. The situation is dramatic con-
sidering that more than 60% of the configuration bits in modern 
Virtex FPGAs are linked to routing resources, although 10 to 
20% of them are typically used. On the other hand, configura-
tion SRAM density keeps on growing in every new FPGA gen-
eration, thus increasing the MBU cross-section [16], [17]. 
Radiation effects must be assessed for every application, as 
they depend on the particular radiation environment, on the 
specific FPGA, and on the specific design implemented on the 
FPGA. The FPGA SEU rate can be estimated using tools like 
CREME96 [18], which provides orbit-averaged static SEU 
rates from FPGA's static cross-section data. For XQR4V/5V 
FPGAs, the cross-section data can be obtained from the test 
reports produced by members of the Xilinx Radiation Test 
Consortium (XRTC) [19]. Fault injection methods [20]-[22], 
can be used to provide a qualitative view on how well a design 
is mitigated [23], but the dynamic SEE characterization on the 
specific design implementation can only be obtained experi-
mentally by accelerator testing. 
IV. CONFIGURATION MEMORY SCRUBBING OVERVIEW 
During the past decade, the research community has proposed 
different solutions for coping with Virtex FPGA configuration 
memory SEUs. This work was also fostered by the research on 
dynamic reconfiguration techniques and fault injection systems, 
and it is continuously supported by industry, government and 
academia via the XRTC. 
Complementary soft error tolerance techniques have been in-
corporated to enable the use of Virtex FPGAs in harsh radiation 
environments. EDAC techniques, such as TMR andECC codes, 
are typically used in user logic and memories for preserving de-
sign functionality and data integrity in the event of SEUs. On the 
other hand, the dynamic reconfigurability of the configuration 
memory can be used, not only for reconfiguring or upgrading the 
application, but also for mitigating soft-errors before they ac-
cumulate potentially defeating EDAC techniques implemented 
in A-Layer. This technique, widely used in SRAM memories, 
is known as memory scrubbing. Both TMR and configuration 
memory scrubbing, when used jointly, provide the highest SEU 
mitigation capability [24]. However, the configuration memory 
scrubbing has some limitations in what concerns error detection 
and mitigation, as will be explained in Section YD. 
Scrubbing is basically a post-configuration memory refresh. 
Typically it is performed in the background without disrupting 
the A-Layer. For this purpose the FPGA initialization com-
mands in the configuration bitstream are omitted, and only 
those required to initialize the scrubbing are kept. In other 
cases, the full bitstream is injected in the C-Layer and the 
application is momentarily suspended then reinitialized. On the 
other hand, readback is a post-configuration memory read. Also 
performed in the background, it does not disrupt the application 
but it may corrupt the data content of some memory elements 
in early Virtex families, as will be explained in Section VD. 
Scrubbing and readback are handled by an error detection 
and correction circuitry, sometimes referred as Configuration 
Manager and informally known as scrubber. Depending on 
system dependability requirements, scrubbers can implement 
anything from simple preventive mitigation to complex adap-
tive reconfigurable strategies. Some basic scrubbing techniques 
for Virtex-4 family are introduced in [7]. These techniques are 
still valid for Virtex-5 family, although they need to be adapted 
to the changes introduced in the configuration logic. Main 
guidelines on radiation effect mitigation for Xilinx FPGAs 
up to Virtex-4 are found in [10], which focuses mainly on 
TMR implementation. A follow-up work was found in [23], 
where both SEFI and SEU detection, mitigation and mitigation 
verification are covered in great detail. Regarding Virtex-5, 
new strategies for SEU handling are proposed by Xilinx in 
[25]. The main difference with respect to methods proposed for 
Virtex-4 is the use of built-in circuitry for error detection and 
correction, as will be explained in Section VA. 
V CONFIGURATION MEMORY SCRUBBING BASICS 
Upon SEEs in C-Layer, a generic scrubber has two main du-
ties: to detect the SEEs and to mitigate them before they ac-
cumulate and/or disrupt the application. The detection phase 
is optional and requires additional complexity, but it generally 
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Fig. 2. Configuration bitstream file (bit), mask file (msk) and readback data 
relationship: masked readback data matches configuration data if no error is 
present. 
allows a more robust mitigation. However in the highest con-
figuration memory size devices, the complexity of the detec-
tion scheme may not be affordable. The application disruption 
is sometimes unavoidable, and the system needs to implement 
functional monitoring (e.g., external watchdog timer circuit) to 
detect it and recover the system. 
A. SEUMBU Detection 
Configuration memory SEU/MBUs can be detected by 
reading back the FPGA configuration data via the configuration 
port, and comparing it with a golden reference stored in a 
non-volatile memory (from now on, golden memory). Xilinx 
development tools generate two files for each configuration bit-
stream file: a readback data file and a mask data file. The mask 
file is used to mask the readback bits that may change during 
operation. Although it is possible to use both the readback data 
and mask data files, the storage of the two files (in addition to 
the bitstream file) needs to be considered at system level, and 
may not be affordable for the most complex FPGA devices 
given the size of the files. A less stringent solution requires only 
the mask data file to be stored in addition to the bitstream file. 
Each masked readback word must be compared with the corre-
sponding golden reference in the bitstream, as shown in Fig. 2. 
In case of mismatch, an error detection flag must be raised to 
trigger the corresponding mitigation actions. For XQR5V, and 
according to latest findings reported by the manufacturer in [8], 
the mask data file (as generated by automated tools) needs to be 
modified in order to mask non-configuration bits (in particular, 
capture bits) that are also part of the readback stream. 
The word-by-word masking and comparison is a comprehen-
sive but rather slow technique and requires accessing the full 
configuration golden memory for comparison. A faster tech-
nique consists on performing a CRC check on the readback data, 
which needs reference CRC codes (much less information than 
the configuration data) to be previously generated and stored 
in internal or external memory. Using for example 32-bit CRC 
codes, the probability of not detecting upsets is as low as 2 - 3 2 . 
CRC can be checked for each frame data, or for the full device 
data [26]. 
For the particular systems implementing device-level TMR 
(in addition to TMR within each FPGA), a 3-way scrubber can 
detect SEU/MBU in each FPGA by comparing readback data 
from each of the independent channels. This allows a fast detec-
tion as a fault-free frame is available in a temporary buffer in-
stead of in external golden memory. The scrubber solution pre-
sented in [27] targets device-level TMR systems and propose 
this kind of solution combined with a self-repair approach. 
A new feature in Virtex-4/5 with respect to its predecessors 
is that every conügamiion frame contains a 12-bit built-in ECC 
code, which uses Single Error Correction Double Error Detec-
tion (SECDED), Hamming code parity values. In case & frame 
bit flips due to SEU, the ECC check will allow detection and 
identification of a single bit in error within the frame, which 
can be used for SEU mitigation. Double error or more can be 
detected but the ECC check does not identify the bits in error. 
ECC bit flips do not affect the A-Layer as they do not configure 
any resource, but may result in bogus SEU detection and the cor-
responding mitigation may corrupt the frame. Virtex-5 also pro-
vides a built-in readback CRC circuit for overall memory error 
detection. This circuit, clocked internally or externally, contin-
uously scans the configuration memory and computes a 32-bit 
CRC value. The CRC value computed right after device con-
figuration is used as the fault-free reference for comparing the 
values obtained in subsequent scans. In case of mismatch, a de-
vice pin is driven low to report the configuration error to an ex-
ternal supervisor. 
B. SEU/MBU Mitigation 
SEU/MBU in configuration memory are mitigated by means 
of static or dynamic reconfiguration. The former implies 
stopping the application and performing a full configuration, 
whereas the latter is to be performed in the background, for the 
full device or part of it, while the application is running. The 
minimum reconfigurable element is a frame. If the detection 
method provides the address of the frame in error, the recon-
figuration can then target that particular frame. If the faulty 
frame address is not available, a full device reconfiguration is 
needed. The former may be preferred, as it generally reduces 
the risk of corrupting the configuration memory. Moreover, 
from a reliability point of view, the time-to-repair is shorter, as 
will be shown in Section VTII.A. 
C. SEFI Detection and Recovery 
Different SEFI modes were found in XQR4V FPGAs during 
radiation testing [11], and a few of them were also found in 
XQR5V [8]. Some can be detected by using an external su-
pervisor, like a watchdog-timer, although others require a more 
complex diagnostic hardware, optionally included in the ex-
ternal scrubber. The exact SEFI mode may be difficult to iden-
tify due to the erratic behavior of the device. Some of them can 
be detected by periodic polling of critical configuration logic 
registers, like Frame Address Register (FAR), Status (STAT) and 
Control (CTL) registers, and comparison with golden reference 
values. For example, a continuous increase of the FAR indi-
cates that the built-in configuration sequencer is out of control, 
which in turn may prevent any attempt for the scrubber to read 
or write configuration memory. To detect this type of SEFI, a 
write-read-check test is recommended before starting any read-
back or scrub sequence [7]. 
Other SEFIs may be detected by monitoring configuration 
port pin voltages. For example, a transition to logic low in the 
DONE pin indicates that the device configuration is lost (or shut-
down sequence is on-going), due to the trigger of the Power-On-
Reset (POR). In most cases, a full reconfiguration is needed to 
recover from SEFI. Power cycling can be optionally used, al-
though in principle it is not needed [23]. 
D. Scrubbing Limitations 
Virtex FPGA SEU/MBU detection and mitigation via read-
back and scrubbing has some inherent limitations: 
• First, errors in hidden resources may propagate across the 
A-Layer without being detected by configuration memory 
readback. For example, half-latches cannot be read back 
nor scrubbed. Error mitigation techniques at A-Layer must 
be able to cope with them. 
• Second, some logic resources cannot be readback be-
cause they can get corrupted. For example, SRL16s and 
LUT-RAMs readback and scrubbing is not allowed in 
early Virtex families. This was fixed in Virtex-4/5 by 
setting a specific configuration register bit (GLUTMASK). 
• Third, some built-in circuitry in Virtex FPGAs cannot be 
scrubbed because they are not accessible. For example the 
configuration controller and the DCM. 
• Fourth, some type of errors are persistent and cannot be 
mitigated only by reconfiguration: a system reset is also re-
quired [28]. Fortunately the persistent error cross-section is 
orders of magnitude lower than the one for non-persistent 
errors (which do not require system reset). 
• Finally, SEU effects in the A-Layer may not be mitigated 
when they affect more than one logic path of a TMR system 
within the same scrub period. 
VI. SCRUBBING METHODOLOGIES 
Basic scrubbing techniques described in Section V can be 
used in different ways, leading to different methodologies. 
Choosing the right methodology for an application typically 
implies trading-off reliability, complexity, flexibility, power 
consumption and cost. Several trade-offs are presented in this 
section, providing the designer with system level considerations 
to be taken into account. 
A. Preventive vs. Corrective Scrubbing 
The simplest scrubbing methodology consists on recon-
figuring cyclically the FPGA, without performing any error 
detection whatsoever. This is referred as preventive or blind 
scrubbing [29], and such a scrubber is said to operate in 
open-loop. Thanks to the Virtex FPGA dynamic reconfigu-
ration capability, the A-Layer operation does not need to be 
interrupted while being scrubbed. In some applications the 
scrubbing can be scheduled periodically, for example just 
before starting an operation period. In that case, a full con-
figuration can be performed without caring about A-Layer 
interruption. With or without interrupting the operation, the 
scrubber would operate in write mode, so any unexpected 
error during the initial FAR configuration could potentially 
corrupt the configuration memory. Fortunately, the probability 
of such event is extremely low [30]. In order to minimize the 
impact of such event, frame-oriented blind scrubbing could be 
implemented instead of device-oriented. 
Another methodology consists on reading back cyclically the 
configuration memory, and triggering the scrubbing only in case 
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Fig. 3. Preventive vs. Corrective scrubbing flow. Preventive scrubbing (left) 
scrubs configuration memory periodically. Corrective scrubbing (right) reads 
back configuration memory periodically, and triggers scrubbing when error is 
detected. In both cases, the scrubbing can be done with (dashed line) or without 
(solid line) re-initiating the application. 
an error is detected. The readback and subsequent scrubbing can 
be either device or^/rawe-oriented, as will be discussed in VLB. 
Once the error scrubbing is completed, the readback process can 
be either resumed or restarted. This methodology is referred as 
corrective scrubbing, and such a scrubber is said to operate in 
closed-loop. Upon error detection, the A-Layer can be scrubbed 
with or without interrupting the operation. The scrubber would 
operate in read mode most of the time, in fact all of the time if 
no error is detected. It is only during scrubbing that configura-
tion memory can potentially get corrupted, but the probability 
is considered much lower than in the preventive scrubbing case, 
and can also be limited to a single frame or a block oí frames. 
A flow diagram for both preventive and corrective method-
ologies is shown in Fig. 3. It must be noted that the timeout 
checking is for the general case where the scrubber runs faster 
than the required scrub or readback rates. In some cases this 
checking is not needed, and the scrubber resources are full time 
devoted to readback and/or scrubbing. 
B. Device vs. Frame-Oriented Detection and Mitigation 
Configuration frames are typically read back or scrubbed se-
quentially by incrementing the FAR following a hardwired sys-
tematic sequence. This is automatically done by Virtex FPGA 
configuration controller when the number of read words exceeds 
the frame boundaries. Therefore, a simple open-loop scrubber 
can cyclically configure the scrub length for the total amount 
of configuration words, i.e., the total amount of configuration 
frames times the number of words per frame, plus a fixed over-
head. This is considered a device-oriented scrubbing as far as 
error detection and mitigation covers the device as a whole. The 
scrub method is simple and has a minimum processing over-
head, however it is exposed (with a very low probability) to the 
potential memory corruption, as highlighted in Section VI.A. 
Likewise, a device-oriented readback can be cyclically con-
figured. In case error is detected, scrubbing is triggered for the 
frame in error, for a block oí frames or for all of them, then 
readback is resumed or restarted depending on the scrubbing 
strategy. 
As opposed to the device-oriented approach, frames can be 
scrubbed or read back individually without using the built-in 
FAR auto-increment feature, which then needs to be imple-
mented in the scrubber itself. The scrubber configures the 
readback length just for the amount of words in & frame (plus 
a fixed overhead). In this case, if an error is detected during 
readback, scrubbing is performed for just one frame before 
reading back the following/rawe. The readback and scrubbing 
functions are interleaved in what is considered a frame-oti-
ented approach. This method has a higher overhead, but the 
mitigation time is minimized as well as corruption probability. 
Intermediate approaches can be envisaged by dividing the 
frame space into blocks, and performing a block-oriented detec-
tion and mitigation. Then one must trade-oííframe block length, 
readback overhead, detection and mitigation time and potential 
corruption probability and effects. 
C. Fixed vs. Adaptive Rate 
Scrub rate (for preventive mitigation) or readback rate (for 
corrective mitigation) was traditionally adjusted to a fixed rate 
of 10 x the maximum expected SEU rate along the mission, 
as recommended in [10]. This sometimes led to complex and 
power hungry scrubber implementations. Berg justified in [30] 
the need for a scrub rate of merely once every few days, which 
allows simpler scrubbers. 
However there are two main reasons for considering a 
variable rate. The first is that the FPGA may not be in op-
erational mode full time, being the rest of the time in idle, 
stand-by or even power-off mode. In stand-by mode, a higher 
SEFI rate may be tolerated (and mitigated by means of full 
reconfiguration), so readback or scrub rate could be reduced (or 
even stopped) in order to decrease system power consumption. 
Because SEUs may accumulate at both C-Layer and A-Layer 
during this mode, a full reconfiguration is deemed necessary 
before resuming operation. 
The second is that radiation environment will vary over time 
during the mission. For example, when the spacecraft is crossing 
the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) region, an increase in par-
ticle flux is expected [31]. Another example is the peak radiation 
levels due to solar activity or Van Allen radiation belts. In all 
these cases, the readback rate could be temporarily increased in 
order to improve reliability and availability. Keeping the read-
back rate to the minimum required anytime during a mission 
helps optimizing the power consumption and heat dissipation, 
as will be explained in VIII.B. The need for adaptability was 
also identified in [32] and [33]. 
The related concept of Reconfigurable Fault Tolerance (RFT) 
was introduced by [33]. The objective of RFT is to enable a 
system to adapt to the optimal balance of performance and reli-
ability during the mission. The performability metric, a combi-
nation of reliability and performance, shows improvements for 
applications using RFT architectures. 
D. ID vs. 2D Scrubbing 
Device configuration frames are typically scanned sequen-
tially along a ID frame space. However, in atypical application, 
part of the configurable fabric is not used. SEUs in the configu-
ration frames associated to unused logic may not be disruptive, 
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Fig. 4. Scrubbing Profile (SP) example, (a) Physical placement of Blocks A&B 
and readback or scrubbing direction, (b) Full FPGA readback or scrubbing di-
rection, (c) SP sequence reading back or scrubbing Block A, then Block B, then 
full FPGA. 
although there is still a possibility that they affect used routing 
resources. On the other hand, specific configuration^awes may 
be more sensitive than others because they configure logic that is 
prone to propagate errors (e.g., voting logic in a TMR scheme). 
Such frames may be physically mapped into a 2D-block and 
read back (or scrubbed) at a higher rate. 
A Scrubbing Profile (SP) is defined as the frame sequence 
followed during readback (or scrubbing) to cover the frames 
of interest, a certain number of times and in a certain order. 
A ID-scrubber will not necessarily follow the frame address 
sequence pre-defined by the FPGA configuration logic, but the 
one defined by the SP. The SP is stored in the scrubber, it is 
repeated cyclically and it can be reprogrammed if needed. An 
SP example is shown in Fig. 4, where two FPGA blocks are read 
back (or scrubbed) at twice the rate than the rest. 
ID or 2D scrubbing can be combined with any of the method-
ologies described in the previous three sections. For example, 
a scrubber may perform 2D readback (for corrective scrub-
bing) on a frame-oriented basis and with a fixed readback rate. 
And a different scrubber may perform ID preventive scrubbing, 
on a device-oriented basis and with a variable readback rate. 
1D/2D reconfiguration was also considered in [34] for block-
based error mitigation. 
VII. SCRUBBER DESIGN ARCHITECTURES 
The scrubbing methodologies described in Section VI can 
be implemented in different scrubber architectures. Again, 
choosing the right architecture for an application typically 
implies trading-off reliability, complexity, flexibility, power 
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Fig. 5. External vs. Internal scrubber. External scrubber (up) accesses config-
uration memory via the configuration port. Internal scrubber (down) accesses 
configuration memory via Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP). 
consumption and cost. Some elementary architectures are 
presented in this section, with references to practical imple-
mentations found in previous works. 
A. External vs. Internal Scrubber 
Scrubbers are typically implemented in a radiation-hardened 
device external to the Virtex FPGA, such as an ASIC or an 
anti-fuse based FPGA. This ensures that scrubber logic itself 
is not affected by SEUs, or at least with a much lower prob-
ability than when embedded in the FPGA itself. Scrubbers in-
ternal to the Virtex FPGA may also be implemented by using the 
ICAP primitive, which provides internal access to the built-in 
configuration logic. However ICAP and internal logic are sus-
ceptible to radiation, so internal scrubbers are qualitatively less 
reliable than external ones, as was shown in [29]. Neverthe-
less, fault-tolerant implementations of ICAP controllers have 
also been investigated in [35]. An implementation combining 
internal scrubber and preventive scrubbing was found in [36], 
although it presents the limitations of both being internal and 
lacking error detection capability. Internal and external scrub-
bers are represented in Fig. 5. 
Two scrubber implementations for Virtex-4 are compared in 
[29], the first one being internal to the FPGA itself and the 
second one implemented in an external FPGA. The internal im-
plementation uses configuration memory readback in conjunc-
tion with SECDED. The external one simply reconfigures cycli-
cally the configuration memory without any readback. Test re-
sults suggest a superior performance of the external implemen-
tation, however the limitations of such type of scrubber have 
been analyzed in Section VI.A. 
An external scrubber in combination with TMR was suc-
cessfully tested on a Virtex-II X-2V1000 device in [37]. The 
scrubber (referred as configuration monitor) was implemented 
on an auxiliary FPGA under the control of a host computer. This 
was continuously reading back, via SelectMAP or JTAG port, 
the configuration memory of the FPGA under test and com-
paring word-by-word with a mask file. Upon error detection, 
the auxiliary FPGA triggered a partial reconfiguration to mit-
igate the error. In addition, mechanisms were implemented to 
detect some types of SEFI and register corruption. 
B. Hardware vs. Software-Based 
Scrubbers can be implemented by hardware, either on an ex-
ternal or internal circuitry which defines a state machine for 
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Fig. 6. Software-Based scrubber. Scrubber includes a microprocessor (/zP) 
and its program memory. Program includes scrubbing algorithm and hardware 
drivers. /JLF accesses the FPGA via General Purpose Input/Outputs (GPIO). 
readback and/or scrubbing. The main advantage of this archi-
tecture is that it can be very fast both in error detection and 
correction. However it lacks flexibility for implementing com-
plex scrubbing strategies. Fig. 5 represents two typical hardware 
implementations based on radiation-hardened FPGA/ASIC (ex-
ternal) or embedded logic (internal). 
Scrubbers can be also implemented on a radiation-hardened 
microprocessor system running a software algorithm. If the mi-
croprocessor has enough General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) 
ports, it can directly drive the FPGA configuration port. Other-
wise it needs an intermediate device to implement the hardware 
interface, as proposed in [38]. As shown in Fig. 6, the memory 
bus includes both the microprocessor memory (program and 
data) as well as the configuration golden memory. The software 
includes two main modules: the scrubbing algorithm (hardware 
independent) and the hardware drivers (specific for the micro-
processor device and configuration port). The main advantage 
of this architecture with respect to a purely hardware one is the 
flexibility and the capability of implementing one or more com-
plex algorithms. On the other hand, a software-based architec-
ture is inherently slower. When implementing a corrective ap-
proach, the microprocessor needs many instruction cycles per 
frame to complete readback and error detection, which could 
be optimized if the microprocessor is devoted to the scrubbing 
function. If detection and mitigation is^/ra/we-based, execution 
time can be improved by pre-computing and storing in program 
memory the frame address sequence. 
Hybrid HW/SW scrubber implementations can also be envis-
aged, for example with an FPGA embedding a microprocessor 
core running the scrubbing algorithm, and programmable logic 
for performing interface and data computation functions. 
Most of the standalone scrubbers found in the literature are 
hardware-based, and a few software/firmware-based were found 
[39], [40]. This excludes systems for accelerator testing setup, 
which may involve a host PC running control software and in-
terfacing the FPGA under test and associated logic. 
C. One vs. N-Way 
In a typical system, the scrubber has to manage a single 
FPGA configuration layer. This is a one-way architecture as 
opposed to others where the scrubber has to manage more 
than one. Systems implementing device-level Dual or Triple 
Modular Redundancy (DMR or TMR) are typical examples 
of the latter. In general, N-way architectures have to manage 
N configuration layers (i.e., channels), and those layers may 
belong to FPGAs implementing device-level redundancy or 
not. 
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concerns the occurrence of the first failure. Reliability and 
MTTF are related by the following equation: 
Fig. 7. N-way scrubbers managing k independent channels in time multiplex 
(left) and k independent channels concurrently (right). 
In some cases, there are temporal constraints for which read-
back has to be concurrent across channels. This is the case for 
scrubbers that perform error detection by means of peer data 
comparison [27]. In that case, individual scrubber logic needs 
to be implemented for each channel. In the general case, when 
channels can be operated with functional and temporal indepen-
dence from others, the same scrubber core logic and data bus 
lines can be shared. Only a few control lines need to be ded-
icated for each channel. Fig. 7 represents two generic N-way 
scrubbers, one of them managing k independent channels in 
time multiplex and the other one managing k redundant chan-
nels concurrently. 
An external N-way scrubber was successfully tested on mul-
tiple Virtex VI 000s implementing a space-based reconfigurable 
radio in [41]. The scrubber was implemented on a radiation-
hardened anti-fuse FPGA, which was continuously scanning 
each of the nine Virtex VI000 via SelectMAP port. The anti-
fuse FPGA computed the CRC, frame by frame, and compared 
it with a codebook of stored CRCs. Upon error detection, the 
anti-fuse FPGA interrupted the main microprocessor, triggered 
a partial reconfiguration to restore the frame in error, then reset 
the system. 
VIII. SYSTEM-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS 
Scrubbing methodologies and architectures need to be 
analyzed together with three essential system-level design re-
quirements: reliability, availability and power consumption. Of 
course, cost is also an important consideration but it is out of the 
scope of this paper. These requirements may impose additional 
constraints in the design of the configuration memory scrubber. 
In this section, a qualitative view is provided for each of them. 
A. Reliability and Availability 
Basic definitions for dependability metrics are given in [42]: 
• Reliability or R(t): the conditional probability that the 
system will perform correctly throughout the interval 
[trj,i], given that the system was performing correctly at 
time to, which concerns the continuity of service. 
• Mean Time To Failure (MTTF): the expected time that a 
system will operate before the first failure occurs, which 
MTTF 
/»oo 
= / R(t)dt 
Jo 
(1) 
Availability or A(t): the probability that a system is oper-
ating correctly and is available to perform its functions at 
the instant time t, which concerns the system readiness for 
the usage. For a simplex system with EDAC, steady-state 
Availability (A(oo)) is related to MTTF and to Mean Time 
To Repair (MTTR) by the following equation: 
A(oo) MTTF 
MTTR + MTTF (2) 
R(t) and A(t) can be estimated analytically by using Markov 
models [43]-[45]. The resulting expressions for systems with 
scrubbing are a function of t, A and fj,, where A is the upset rate 
(approximating SEU by a Poisson process) and ¡j, is the SEU 
repair rate for configuration memory. For analytical purposes, 
both A and ¡j, are assumed to be constant, leading the latter to a 
MTTR equal to l//i. 
The Availability (J4(OO)) expressions for TMR (with correc-
tion capability) systems can also be found in [45]. An important 
consideration from this previous work is that A{oo) for systems 
with a fixed scrubbing rate improves (up to the maximum) with 
increasing scrub period, but after a certain period it drops rela-
tively fast. Therefore, for a given A and /x, one should choose the 
scrub period that maximizes A(oo). Availability numbers based 
on experimental data are also given in [6]. 
Assuming that the application needs to be stopped while 
repairing (i.e., scrubbing), MTTR is lower when scrubbing 
a single frame than when scrubbing the full device, and this 
improves Availability. However in a TMR system, the applica-
tion may not need to be stopped as long SEUs are affecting no 
more than one design module. In that case Availability is not 
impacted until a second SEU affects a second module. 
TMR systems with an arbitrary number of partitions can be 
implemented to tolerate Multiple Independent Upsets (MIU) in 
multiple redundant circuits. Markov model theory and experi-
mental validation for such systems is presented in [44], where 
reliability is shown to improve with increasing number of par-
titions. Another consideration is the possibility of having per-
sistent errors [46]. Such type of errors cannot be mitigated by 
scrubbing, and the system becomes permanently unavailable. A 
Markov model for a TMR system having a fraction of errors 
being persistent is also presented in [43]. 
An alternate way to evaluate the reliability is found in [24]. 
In this work, a reliability model for estimating the MTTF of 
designs implemented on Virtex-4 XQR4VSX55 FPGA is pro-
posed. The failure probability during a single scrub cycle is an-
alyzed, and the composite failure rate Ac is the summation of 
several A¿/9¿ terms. Each term is the probability of being in an 
orbit condition pi, times the failure rate during such orbit con-
dition A¿. The obtained expression for MTTF includes two fac-
tors that need to be obtained separately by different means. The 
first factor, which is the probability of having i SEUs during the 
scrub period, needs to be estimated using CREME96 orbit-av-
eraged static SEU rates. The second factor, which is the prob-
ability of failure during the scrub period if i SEUs occurred 
during that period, needs to be obtained experimentally. For the 
latter, two experimental methods are tested and correlated: fault 
injection and accelerator testing. This experimental work yields 
a few important conclusions for the system designer: 
• The MTTF of a design with TMR and scrubbing is about 
four orders of magnitude greater than the non-TMR design. 
• With the same FPGA and irradiation conditions, the relia-
bility is very design-dependent. 
• The scrub rate increase reduces the probability of having 
more than one SEU per scrub period, and therefore im-
proves the reliability. 
As a final consideration, reliability can be improved at design 
time by analyzing the most sensitive parts of the design and 
performing a reliability-aware place and route of the design in 
the FPGA [47], [34]. 
B. Power Consumption 
Configuration memory scrubbing comes at a power cost that 
can be split in two components: power consumed and dissi-
pated by the configuration port and built-in configuration con-
troller, and power consumed and dissipated by the scrubber cir-
cuitry. When the scrubber is internal to the Virtex FPGA, both 
components add up and contribute to the overall FPGA power 
consumption and dissipation. When the scrubber is an external 
device, only considering its static power dissipation makes the 
overall system power increase substantially. 
The first thing to be considered is that power overhead is 
driven by the scrub or readback rate. If these rates are kept fixed 
to a value such that reliability requirement is met under peak ra-
diation levels predicted for the mission, most likely the power 
overhead is unnecessarily high most of the time. However, if 
rates are dynamically adapted to the radiation environment, the 
power overhead can be reduced to the the minimum necessary 
at any given time. The former would be the case for a fixed rate 
scrubbing methodology, while the latter could be achieved with 
an adaptive rate methodology, both described in Section VI.C. 
Another factor contributing to the power overhead is the 
configuration clock operation during scrub or readback phases. 
For SelectMAP (the usual configuration port used for scrub-
bing), the clock can be free-running or actively controlled (i.e., 
clocking only when necessary). The latter can be used in order 
to minimize power due to clock switching during readback 
and scrubbing, even to keep clock idle during the rest of the 
time. For example, in a corrective scrubbing scenario (see 
Section VI.A), variable clocking frequency can be envisaged 
in order to perform readback at lowest possible frequency 
(while meeting the readback rate requirement) and to perform 
scrubbing at higher frequency in order to minimize the MTTR 
and improve Availability (see Section VIII.A). 
In spite of the importance of power consumption at system 
level, no power characterization for mitigation techniques was 
found in previous work. This is outlined as a line for future 
work. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This paper highlights the benefits of SRAM-based FPGAs, 
and in particular Xilinx Virtex-4QV and -5QV FPGAs, for 
high-performance reconfigurable applications, and at the same 
time addresses the inherent susceptibility to ionizing radiation. 
Virtex FPGA architecture is recalled, conceptually separating 
Application Layer from Configuration Layer. Radiation effects 
at both layers are reviewed, focusing on the latter. Configuration 
memory scrubbing basics, methodologies and architectures are 
identified and classified, trading-off benefits and limitations for 
each particular choice. Finally, system-level reliability, avail-
ability and power consumption considerations are discussed, 
as they provide driving requirements to the scrubber design. 
Future work is outlined in the research of novel design method-
ologies and architectures for reliability-aware and power-aware 
configuration memory scrubbers for SRAM-based FPGAs. 
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